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LOCALISM, LABELS, AND ANIMAL
WELFARE
Samuel R. Wiseman*
ABSTRACT
The law does relatively little to improve the welfare of animals raised for food. In the
short term, at least, market-based solutions appear to have more promise as a means of
promoting farm animal welfare, as consumers increasingly seek out local and humanelyraised meat and eggs. To aid consumers in identifying these products, certification systems
of varying degrees of rigor exist, but even these are of little use to consumers in the
restaurant context, which accounts for a large percentage of meat consumption. Patrons
see only finished meals, making fraud difficult to detect, and a recent newspaper
investigation suggests that fraud may indeed be widespread. Solving this problem likely
involves a combination of heightened regulatory efforts and activism from local
agriculture and animal welfare groups.
I. INTRODUCTION
As consumer attention to the source and quality of food has grown in recent years,
so, too, has concern about the practices used to raise food. With criticism of mass
agriculture and processed foods entering the mainstream, consumers are more aware of the
variety of conditions endured by livestock, such as crowded cattle feedlots and cramped
boxes for egg-laying hens. And there is evidence that consumers are sufficiently concerned
about these conditions to change their buying habits accordingly.1 But there are few
regulations that meaningfully address the welfare of the animals that supply much of the
food on consumers’ plates. Most animal welfare regulations apply to pets or activities that
have historically captured public concern, such as rooster and dog fighting.2 And the few
*

McConnaughhay and Rissman Professor, Florida State University College of Law. Many thanks to David
Dana for organizing the Third Annual Searle Center Research Roundtable on Animal Law and Regulation:
Local Food Law, Animal Welfare, and Sustainability, and to him and the roundtable participants for many
helpful comments and suggestions. Thanks also to Emilie O'Toole and the JLSP staff for their thoughtful
edits and patience.
1
See, e.g., Sean P. Sullivan, Empowering Market Regulation of Agricultural Animal Welfare Through
Product Labeling, 19 Animal L. 391, 405–06 (2013) (noting that “[t]he general consensus appears to be
that consumer spending habits are, if anything, responsible for decreasing the overall provision of
agricultural animal welfare, not increasing it,” but that contingent valuation surveys involving hypothetical
willingness to pay U.S. consumers “indicate a willingness to pay substantial premiums for animal products
associated with enhanced-welfare practices”).
2
See, e.g., Justin Marceau, How the Animal Welfare Act Harms Animals, HASTINGS L.J. (forthcoming
2018) (describing how the structure of the AWA allows negligent and abusive animal owners to “hide”
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regulations that do address livestock typically only indirectly impact welfare by, for
example, limiting pollution from large livestock operations. Some local governments and
states have begun to directly regulate farm animal welfare—banning foie gras from forcefed geese and eggs from crate-bound hens, for example—but they represent the exception
to the norm.3
Given the scant public law in this area, the best available means of influencing farm
animal welfare appear to be market-based solutions explored in other contexts. The
environmental law literature, in particular, documents a variety of non-regulatory
mechanisms that can effect change,4 although the success of these approaches varies. In
the food context, the most promising mechanisms to harness consumer choice and market
forces in favor of animal welfare include verified labeling (particularly where producers
can see declines in wholesale and retail sales and trace the consumer preferences associated
with the decline); audit, inspection, and certification of farms and ranches; and, particularly
for restaurants, procurement and supply chain certification. Indeed, some of these
approaches are already employed in the food context. For example, there are a limited
number of voluntary guidelines and certification programs to which both small and large
farms subscribe.5 And it is increasingly common to see labels boasting that eggs are free
range or that beef comes from pasture-raised cows,6 although these claims sometimes lack
certification. Like greenwashing in the environmental context, many of these claims merely
increase profit margins without providing meaningful or verifiable changes in producer
practices.
With somewhat limited formal market mechanisms available—and questionable
verification behind some of the common animal welfare claims—many consumers who are
concerned about animal welfare appear to rely on more rudimentary proxies for welfare by
purchasing “local” food. Some shoppers at farmers markets and patrons of farm-to-table
restaurants are there, in part, because they assume that livestock raised on smaller, local
farms is less likely to have spent its life in a crate with very limited access to light and air,
and was perhaps butchered more humanely.7 And even consumers who primarily focus on
food quality, taste, and environmental impacts—other common reasons for purchasing
local foods—likely at least appreciate the added, assumed benefit that the food was more
humanely raised. Indeed, this assumption is perhaps correct in most circumstances. A pig
or hen raised on a smaller, “sustainable” farm with fewer heads of livestock is less likely
to be crammed into a crate or stall with other animals.8 If so, animals benefit when local
meat supplants mass-produced meat, regardless of consumers’ motivations.

behind the veneer of an AWA license, how the Act focuses on a very arrow set of animals, and how it is
“being employed to benefit those who exploit animals”). See also infra notes 14–18 and accompanying
text.
3
See infra notes 16, 19–28, and their accompanying text.
4
See, e.g., Michael P. Vandenbergh, Private Environmental Governance, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 129 (2013);
Amanda C. Leiter, Fracking, Federalism, and Private Governance, 39 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 107 (2015).
5
See infra notes 62-81 and accompanying text.
6
See infra note 62 and accompanying text.
7
See infra note 96 and accompanying text.
8
See, e.g., Why Buy Sustainable?, GRACE COMM. FOUND., http://www.sustainabletable.org/943/why-buysustainable (last visited Nov. 2, 2017) (“Sustainably raised animals are treated humanely and are permitted
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But local food claims appear, unfortunately, to be often unreliable. Food sold at
farmers markets and farm-to-table restaurants may not be, in fact, local. As explored in
prior work, farmers market fraud, although difficult to detect and quantify, appears not
uncommon.9 And recent investigations of restaurants, which will be a focus of this Essay,
have revealed that supposedly local meat came from the freezer truck of a large foodservice
distributor.10 Given that more than 40% of food spending was on food outside the home as
of 2012, the scope of the problem is potentially large.11
Considering the potential of demand for local and humanely raised meat to enhance
animal welfare, this Essay explores potential approaches to better verifying the origin of
food products. For direct purchases, improved labeling and verification of the specific
claim on the label would allow consumers to signal their preference for animal welfare by
purchasing local foods raised in more humane conditions. And for food purchased in
restaurants, a procurement/supply chain verification program—although likely
expensive—is a potential solution. Alternatively, the health inspections that local
governments and state officials already conduct, and which sometimes include source
verification, could be conducted more frequently, and the severity of punishment could be
increased. Perhaps more realistically, local food groups and nonprofit agricultural
organizations could supply the resources needed for verifying the local origin of animal
products at restaurants, conducting the types of investigations recently completed by the
Tampa Bay Times.12
Part I of this Essay documents the dearth of direct animal welfare regulations, and
Part II introduces the range of potential market-based approaches that could apply in the
food context. Part III discusses localism as a proxy for animal welfare and the problem of
local food fraud, then briefly explores potential strategies for best alerting customers to the
local attributes of food to enable customers to purchase food that they believe is more likely
to have been raised humanely, along with other benefits of local animal products. This part
addresses the problem as well as potential fixes with a focus on the restaurant context. For
those most concerned about animal welfare, public law might ultimately be a more
effective route if adequate enforcement resources were available, or more direct consumer
signals than choosing local foods might be preferable. But given the current options and
the apparently common reliance on food source as a proxy for welfare, food origin claims,
particularly those made by restaurants, appear to need far better verification if they are to
serve as a second- or third-best signal for consumers’ animal welfare preferences.
II. THE LIMITED PUBLIC LAW OF FARM ANIMAL WELFARE
Animal welfare has a long history in the United States, but the public laws in this
area—while old—are not extensive. The American Society for the Prevention of Cruelty

to carry out natural behaviors such as rooting in the dirt and pecking the ground . . . . Factory-farmed
animals are crammed together in unsanitary conditions where they suffer horribly and are often sick.”).
9
See Samuel R. Wiseman, Fraud in the Market, REGENT U. L. REV. 367, 369 (2014).
10 See infra note 106-08 and accompanying text.
11
Food-Away-From-Home, U.S. DEP’T AGRIC.: ECON. RES. SERV., https://www.ers.usda.gov/topics/foodchoices-health/food-consumption-demand/food-away-from-home.aspx (last visited Nov. 2, 2017).
12
See infra note 106-08 and accompanying text.
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to Animals was founded in 1866, initially focusing on the treatment of workhorses and
carthorses, as well as cockfighting and dogfighting.13 This group and other humane
societies that soon organized fought for and sometimes successfully obtained limited state
and local (and, in rare instances, federal14) legislation addressing animal welfare issues.15
The most common legislation now prohibits cruelty to animals—particularly pets—and
continues to ban rooster and dog fighting,16 although enforcement of these laws varies
widely.17
Much of this legislation primarily benefits the animals that are most visible in
people’s lives—pets and farm animals used for entertainment rather than food production
practices.18 But the rise of the foodie movement and more attention paid to the quality of
food and its production has generated growing concern about the welfare of animals raised
for meat and other products. And some local governments and states have responded with
legislation and voter initiatives. In California, voters opted to ban small animal enclosures
for chickens, calves, and pregnant pigs within the state,19 and the legislature subsequently
prohibited the sale in California of any eggs from chickens raised in small cages.20 The
California legislature also banned the sale of foie gras 21—which is meat from force-fed

History of the ASPCA, AM. SOC’Y FOR PREVENTION CRUELTY TO ANIMALS,
https://www.aspca.org/about-us/history-of-the-aspca (last visited Nov. 2, 2017).
14
Animal Welfare Act, Pub. L. No. 89-544, § 1, 80 Stat. 350 (codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 2131–2159)
(addressing the humane treatment of “animals intended for use in research facilities or for exhibition
purposes or for use as pets”); 49 U.S.C. § 80502 (prohibiting, with some exceptions, the confined transport
of “animals in a vehicle or vessel for more than 28 consecutive hours without unloading the animals for
feeding, water, and rest”); Humane Methods of Slaughter Act of 1958, Pub. L. No. 85-765, 72 Stat. 862
(codified at 7 U.S.C. §§ 1901—1907) (hereinafter “Humane Methods of Slaughter Act of 1958”) (requiring
that “cattle, calves, horses, mules, sheep, swine, and other livestock” be “rendered insensible to pain by a
single blow or gunshot or an electrical, chemical or other means that is rapid and effective, before being
shackled, hoisted, thrown, cast, or cut,” or that they be slaughtered “in accordance with” certain “ritual
requirements of the Jewish faith or any other religious faith”); see also Valerie J. Watnick, The Business
and Ethics of Laying Hens: California’s Groundbreaking Law goes into Effect on Animal Confinement, 43
B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 45, 55–56 (2016) (describing these laws and proposed but failed federal laws
addressing the welfare of farm animals).
15
History of the ASPCA, supra note 13.
16
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 750.49 (West 2006) (prohibiting the ownership and use of animals for
“fighting, baiting, or shooting” or as a target for marksmanship).
17
See Marceau, supra note 2.
18
Some general animal welfare laws could be extended to livestock, but in some cases courts may be
hesitant to extend the language to livestock, in part due to legislative restrictions that would seem to
prohibit this. For example, Michigan provides that a person shall not “[k]nowingly kill, torture, mutilate,
maim, or disfigure an animal” but also makes clear that the law “does not prohibit the lawful killing of
livestock or a customary animal husbandry or farming practice involving livestock.” MICH. COMP. LAWS
ANN. § 750.50b (West 2009). While one could argue that confining hens in tiny boxes that prohibit the
hens from extending their feet or moving around constitutes torture, it is a customary farming practice in
many states and likely is not covered by the law. See also Marceau, supra note 2 (describing the limited
groups of animals to which the AWA applies).
19
Standards for Confining Farm Animals, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25990–25994 (2008),
available at http://vig.cdn.sos.ca.gov/2008/general/title-sum/pdf/prop2-title-summary.pdf.
20
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25996 (2015); see also Watnick, supra note 14, at 46 (describing the
initiative and legislation).
21
CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 25982 (2012).
13
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birds—as did the City of Chicago for a short time.22 In other examples of the small but
growing public law effort to address farm animal welfare, Michigan has a statute similar
to California’s initiative, prohibiting confinement that prevents a pregnant pig, veal calf,
or egg-laying hens from “lying down, standing up, or fully extending its limbs” or “turning
around freely,”23 and Arizona,24 Colorado25 and Maine have similar legislative language
for pregnant pigs and veal calves.26 Florida27 and Oregon28 limit their prohibitions on
inhumane confinement to pregnant pigs.
Aside from these types of state laws, similar provisions at the local levels (where
local governments are not preempted from regulating farm animal welfare, as they are in
some states29), and federal laws addressing the humane transport and slaughter30 of farm
animals, there are few public laws to establish a baseline of humane treatment for farm
animals. Pollution laws, such as those that limit water pollutants from large confined
animal feeding operations, might indirectly address welfare by forcing a reduction of the
number of animals producing manure within a particular space. But for those concerned
about the issue, the most promising solutions appear to be market-based mechanisms, as
discussed in the following Part.

Ill. Rest. Ass’n v. City of Chi., 492 F. Supp. 2d 891, 892 (N.D. Ill. 2007) (describing the 2006 Chicago
ordinance); Ill. Rest. Ass’n v. City of Chi., No. 06 C 7014, 2008 WL 8915042 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 7, 2008)
(describing the repeal of the ordinance).
23
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 287.746 (West 2010).
24
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 13-2910.07–13.2910.08.
25
COLO. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 35-50.5-101–103 (West 2008).
26
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 7, § 4020 (2009); id. tit. 17 § 1039 (2014). Note that this is not a
comprehensive survey. For a helpful summary of states’ animal welfare laws—in cases where these laws
have been located by researchers—see Elizabeth R. Rumley, States’ Farm Animal Confinement Statutes,
NAT’L AGRIC. L. CTR., http://nationalaglawcenter.org/state-compilations/farm-animal-welfare/ (last visited
Nov. 8, 2017).
27
FLA. CONST. art. X, § 21.
28
OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 600.150 (West 2008).
29
See, e.g., S.C. CODE ANN. § 47-4-160 (2009) (“Units of local government in this State may not enact
ordinances, orders, or other regulations concerning the care and handling of livestock and poultry.”); GA.
CODE ANN. § 2-1-6 (West 2009) (“No county, municipality, consolidated government, or other political
subdivision of this state shall adopt or enforce any ordinance, rule, regulation, or resolution regulating . . .
animal husbandry practices involved in the production of agricultural or farm products on any private
property.”); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 2, § 2-4c (West 2009) (“No municipality, county, or other political
subdivision of this state shall enact or enforce any order, ordinance, or regulation concerning the care and
handling of livestock within its jurisdiction that is more restrictive than rules promulgated by the Oklahoma
Department of Agriculture, Food, and Forestry concerning the care and handling of livestock . . . .”).
30
Humane Methods of Slaughter Act of 1958.
22
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III. MARKET-BASED OPTIONS

Market-based approaches are touted by some scholars and potential regulatory
targets as beneficial alternatives or additions to public law.31 If designed correctly, they can
more directly and efficiently address public concerns by harnessing consumer demand to
affect producer behavior through market competition. Additionally, the entity that would
otherwise be the target of regulation (or takes market approaches in addition to regulation)
can choose the best, least costly means of addressing consumer preferences as opposed to
facing governmental restrictions that define and limit acceptable compliance approaches.
Critics of these approaches point to a variety of downfalls, such as the many
situations in which market signals are imperfect, or where providing consumers with
information does not allow consumers to choose alternatives that will accurately address
their concerns. In the environmental context, critics have also documented the common
problem of greenwashing, where companies make labeling claims or obtain relatively loose
certifications to sell their product at a higher price point without actually achieving the
social benefits claimed.32
Market-based mechanisms for changing producer behavior are certainly imperfect,
but particularly in contexts like animal welfare they might be the best available solution at
this point. Animal welfare laws exhibit classic public choice problems, in which diffuse,
relatively disorganized stakeholders who would collectively benefit from the laws often
lose out to concentrated farming interests that individually have a great deal to lose if they
are subject to regulation.33 Most recently, this was perhaps best demonstrated by efforts to
make poultry raising more humane. The Humane Society of the United States and United
Egg Producers—a powerful cooperative of poultry farmers34—managed to reach a
compromise regarding the welfare of laying hens and advanced proposed federal
legislation based on this compromise.35 But other powerful agricultural lobbying groups
opposed the legislation and effectively killed it.36
Of course, if powerful agricultural interests are this ardently opposed to animal welfare
regulation, there might be little motivation for them to voluntarily adopt protections. But if
market signals are strong and direct enough, they could at least incrementally change producer

31

See, e.g., Michael P. Vandenbergh, The New Wal-Mart Effect: The Role of Private Contracting in Global
Governance, 54 UCLA L. REV. 913 (2007) (describing and favorably analyzing supply chain contracting
for environmental protection in markets with lax environmental regulation); Daniel C. Esty, Environmental
Protection in the Information Age, 79 N.Y.U. L. REV. 115 (2004) (noting the potential for improved
information on pollution to enhance “market-based strategies” in addition to regulatory regimes).
32
See, e.g., Miriam A. Cherry, The Law and Economics of Corporate Social Responsibility and
Greenwashing, 14 U.C. DAVIS BUS. L.J. 281 (2014) (defining the term, describing its history, and exploring
greenwashing problems).
33
See Jerry L. Anderson, Protection for the Powerless: Political Economy History Lessons for the Animal
Welfare Movement, 4 STAN. J. ANIMAL L. & POL'Y 1, 12 (2011) (“The insights of public choice theory can
help explain the difficulty of enacting legislative reform, such as . . . animal welfare regulation, despite
broad public support, when industrialists with concentrated economic self-interests dominate the political
landscape.”).
34
About Us, UNITED EGG PRODUCERS, http://www.unitedegg.org/ (last visited Nov. 2, 2017) (showing that
the group represents “the ownership of approximately 95% of all the nation's egg-laying hens”).
35
Watnick, supra note 14, at 57.
36
Id. at 57–58.
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behavior, and/or lead to a larger supply of truly humanely raised and slaughtered meat. Marketbased approaches used in other contexts that could find some purchase in the animal welfare
context include labeling, producers’ following voluntary guidelines and standards, producers’
following standards and obtaining certification through an auditing regime, and retailers’ use
of procurement/supply chain certification.
A. Market-Based Approaches in the Environmental Context
The environmental law literature, in particular, has thoroughly charted the terrain of
these and other market-based mechanisms.37 Some of these tools involve governmental
intervention in the sense that the government requires certain producer actions that could
support market-based change, such as requiring the labeling of toxic products, which
consumers might avoid.38 Others are voluntarily followed by producers due to perceived
or proven customer demand and associated market share advantages, or, more simply, a
desire for producers to be good corporate citizens.
One of the most common examples of the use of labeling is a government-based
initiative to inform consumers of the toxicity of products and associated health risks,
including cancer, called California Proposition 65.39 This voter-based initiative, enacted in
1986, requires producers, workplace managers, and others to provide “clear and reasonable
warning” before exposing consumers to chemicals “known to the state to cause cancer or
reproductive toxicity.”40 The resulting regulation constitutes a broad labeling requirement,
covering “everything from shoe polish, newly constructed homes, and food and wine, to
chemicals in the workplace and factory emissions.”41 Despite criticism regarding potential
overwarning and inadequate communication of risk to the public, among other
weaknesses,42 the requirement motivated some manufacturers to change the ingredients in
their products, such as submersible water pumps, ceramicware, and foil caps on wine that
previously contained lead.43
Many producers label products with certain attributes even when they are not
required to do so—opting, of course, to convey positive attributes that will inspire more
consumers to buy their goods. In some cases the labels used are baseless, as demonstrated
by a growing number of lawsuits.44 But some labels are backed by legitimate practices that
37

See supra note 4.
See infra notes 39–42 and accompanying text.
39
Safe Drinking Water and Toxic Enforcement Act of 1986, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §§ 25249.5–
25249.25 (West 1987).
40
Id. § 25249.6.
41
Clifford Rechtschaffen, The Warning Game: Evaluating Warnings Under California’s Proposition 65,
23 ECOLOGY L.Q. 303, 306 (1996).
42
Id. at 327–33, 355–58 (summarizing the literature critiquing the proposition).
43
Id. at 341–42, 346–47.
44
Parker v. J.R. Smucker Co., No. C 13–0690 SC, 2013 WL 4516156, at *1, *6 (N.D. Cal. Aug. 23, 2013)
(addressing a claim that the claimed “all natural” oils supplied by the producer were not natural because
they contained oils from genetically modified crops and noting that “the Court cannot as a matter of law
conclude, as Defendant urges, that reasonable consumers would all understand that packaged, non-organic
foods may contain bioengineered ingredients”); Viggiano v. Hansen Nat. Corp., 944 F.Supp.2d 877, 881,
899 (C.D. Cal. 2013) (in a case involving alleged artificial ingredients in diet sodas labeled as containing
“all natural flavors” but containing “two synthetic ingredients,” dismissing the case without prejudice
38
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producers have chosen to follow. Some producers voluntarily comply with standards
associated with a private or governmental audit and certification program, have their
compliance verified, and then indicate compliance on their product. A common voluntary
government-sponsored certification program is the Environmental Protection Agency’s
(EPA) Energy Star label. To bear this label, which represents a product with a minimum
level of proven energy efficiency, products must be “tested in an EPA-recognized
laboratory and reviewed by an EPA-recognized certification body” that confirms product
compliance with voluntary efficiency standards written by EPA officials.45
For products that involve multiple components, or one ingredient sourced from a
variety of suppliers, many certification programs also include a supply chain verification
component. The program must “trace the origins of products, and product components,
accurately through the many steps required to get a product to market.” 46 A long-running
environmental program with a supply chain certification component is the Sustainable
Forestry Initiative (SFI), under which paper producers wishing to use the SFI label comply
with third-party “requirements pertaining to indigenous and traditional use rights, worker
safety, local employment, and community involvement,” in addition to environmental
practices and undergo third-party audits.47 SFI has additional, specific standards for “fiber
sourcing certification,” where certificate participants must “show that the raw material in
their supply chain comes from legal and responsible sources,” and similar “chain-ofcustody” standards that “track[] forest fiber content . . . through production and
manufacturing to the end product.”48 Paper companies that participate in the fiber sourcing
certification program must employ an auditor, must describe the “forestland, fiber
procurement, and/or manufacturing operations included in the audit,” and “maintain
records” of all source material, among other tools designed to allow the certifier to trace
the source of the fiber in the paper.49 The Forest Stewardship Council has similar
certification programs that are generally viewed as being more stringent.50

because it was possible for the plaintiff to “replead his claims to avoid preemption and state a plausible
claim for relief by identifying artificial flavors, rather than artificial ingredients, that Hansen’s soda
contains, or by identifying inconsistencies between the ‘all natural flavors’ label and the ingredients list”);
Diana R. H. Winters, The Magical Thinking of Food Labeling: The NLEA as a Failed Statute, 89 TUL. L.
REV. 815, 847 n.179 (2015) (listing many other lawsuits relating to producers’ claims regarding “natural”
food).
45
Third-Party Certification, ENVTL. PROTECTION AGENCY,
https://www.energystar.gov/index.cfm?c=third_party_certification.tpc_index (last visited Nov. 4, 2017).
46
Andrea Migone & Michael Howlett, From Paper Trails to DNA Barcodes: Enhancing Traceability in
Forest and Fishery Certification, 52 NAT. RESOURCES J. 421, 424 (2012).
47
Karen Bradshaw Schulz, New Governance and Industry Culture, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2515, 2539
(2013).
48
SFI Standard 2015–2019, SUSTAINABLE FORESTRY INITIATIVE, http://www.sfiprogram.org/sfi-standards/
(last visited Nov. 4, 2017).
49
SUSTAINABLE FORESTRY INITIATIVE, SFI 2015–2019 FIBER SOURCING STANDARD 8, 14 (2015),
http://www.sfiprogram.org/files/pdf/2015-2019-standardsandrules-section-3-pdf/.
50
Schultz, supra note 47 (“gold standard”); Migone & Howlett, supra note 46 (describing FSC certification
and supply chain verification and challenges associated with it).
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B. Market-Based Strategies in the Food Context
In the food context, the USDA has issued regulations that establish a traceability
program for animal disease.51 These regulations are designed to allow the agency to
identify an animal at slaughter and trace it back to its birth location and other locations in
order to identify the potential origin of a disease.52 The agency can also trace animals in
the opposite direction, looking from a flock or herd on a farm and tracing animals forward
to the point of slaughter, in addition to enabling certain tracking of “animals’ interstate
movements.”53
Another food-based area that has received substantial supply chain attention is the
sale of fish and processed fish. The Marine Stewardship Council has a certification
program through which it verifies the source of fish by certifying, among other things,
fishing areas, certain types of fish species, and the types of technologies used to catch
fish.54 But the program has encountered challenges, as evidenced by its failure to detect
and correct the mislabeling of fish as Chilean sea bass.55 Some scientists have pioneered
programs that enable more direct tracing of fish source (and certain other types of food,
such as coffee and genetically-modified food) through DNA barcoding.56 Through this
process, scientists use specific molecular markers and genetic analysis of these markers to
identify the specific food within a product.57 The FDA has approved DNA barcoding to
prove the source of fish for compliance purposes,58 and there have been public efforts to
require more attention to safety and fraud issues in seafood, although not all have been
successful. The proposed federal Safety and Fraud Enforcement for Seafood Act, which
died in committee in Congress, would have required fish processors to include data “on the
packaging display or otherwise[] including the market and species name, catch date” and
other information.59 Other federal traceability programs for fish are moving forward,
including NOAA’s Seafood Import Monitoring Program,60 which “establishes the
reporting and recordkeeping requirements needed to prevent illegally harvested and
misrepresented seafood from entering into U.S. Commerce.”61

51

Traceability for Livestock Moving Interstate, 78 Fed. Reg. 2040 (2013).
See generally U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC., ANIMAL DISEASE TRACEABILITY OVERVIEW (2014),
https://www.aphis.usda.gov/animal_health/downloads/sacah/ADT%20Overview%20for%20SACAH%200
5%2022%2014.pdf.
53
Id. at 1.
54
Migone & Howlett, supra note 46, at 430–31 (citing MSC, INTERPRETING THE MSC PRINCIPLES AND
CRITERIA FOR SUSTAINABLE FISHING (2007)).
55
Id. at 425.
56
Id. at 433, 435–36.
57
Id. at 433.
58
Id. at 434 n.63.
59
Safety and Fraud Enforcement for Seafood Act, S. 520, 113th Cong. (2013), available at
https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/senate-bill/520.
60
See NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ADMIN., U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, FINAL RULE TO IMPLEMENT
U.S. SEAFOOD IMPORT MONITORING PROGRAM (n.d.),
http://www.iuufishing.noaa.gov/Portals/33/Traceabililty%20Final%20Rule%20%20FRIR%20%20FRFA.pdf.
61
82 Fed. Reg. 31758 (July 10, 2017).
52
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C. Market-Based Animal Welfare Programs

Just as private environmental governance has become a mainstream practice and
topic, food has long been a target of various efforts to channel consumer preferences to
improve food safety and, more recently, food quality and social stewardship. Mandatory
labeling has primarily focused on nutrition, quality, and safety. But producers increasingly
voluntarily prescribe to a variety of information disclosure practices—some more formal
than others.
There are few government-led voluntary labeling programs for animal welfare. This
is likely partially due to the USDA and FDA’s focus on ingredients and food quality rather
than the processes leading up to slaughter, packaging and labeling. As Professor Sean
Sullivan notes, the USDA’s only animal welfare-based labeling program is for poultry
meat, and it only includes one label—“free range or free roaming”—for which “[p]roducers
must demonstrate to the Agency that the poultry has been allowed access to the outside.”62
The USDA’s organic standards partially address animal welfare, but only to a limited
extent.63
With the dearth of government-backed labeling options for animal welfare and a lack
of enforcement by the agencies tasked with verifying the credibility of all food product
claims,64 many producers label products as having certain animal welfare-based attributes
without providing certification or other third-party assurance that the claims are true.65 The
proliferation of labels such as “free range,” “free roaming,” “cage free,” “pasture-raised,”
“grass fed,” and other terms, all of which lack a single, consensus-based definition and
many of which lack verification, causes both consumer confusion and credibility
concerns.66
There are a limited number of audit and certification programs for small and large U.S.
farms, as well as guidelines that producers can voluntarily follow or incorporate as part of an
audit or certification program, and these provide credibility in labeling. The programs vary in

Sullivan, supra note 1, at 412; Meat and Poultry Labeling Terms, U.S. DEP’T OF AGRIC.,
https://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/portal/fsis/topics/food-safety-education/get-answers/food-safety-factsheets/food-labeling/meat-and-poultry-labelingterms/!ut/p/a1/jZHfT4MwEMf_Fh94LC0yl803QmIEHWQhatcXU7ZrISktaTsJ_vUyjSYzm-7u6e439wvzDDFTPO3VnLfGs3VIWbzV7Im82iZkrxcRnckK57X5UOakkV1MwGbP4AivlB_xhLynz6_oMG1X
aUriVnPfYNaLQymEjzi2g1gHabCmB1yXIAfkeBbj1wD4L8LitegWi0x7YAfVDvUm73ydvwpIQ2c_gFsNpSDR5VsTV7D4vYlLOfgMnzvUFnL_HtLBUpv78zSbRdbyYNrMgwIIN93ZKN9737jYgARmGIZTGS
AXh1nQBOSVpjPOYHpO4757o-2MiqgyxehyuPgCErj8l/#4 (last visited Nov. 4, 2017).
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Sullivan, supra note 1, at 413 n.122.
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Id. at 410 (noting that the FDA and USDA are supposed to approve “all animal-product labels” the
agencies do not generally enforce labels in the animal welfare area, aside from the USDA inspecting
“labels merely to determine conformity with producer-submitted affidavits regarding the claimed welfare
practices”).
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terms of the animals they apply to, the stages of production covered, the types of entities
certified under the programs, and their cost to participants, among other differences.67
The American Humane Association claims to have “created the first welfare
certification program in the United States” 68 and was also an early lobbyist for federal
animal welfare laws.69 Its primary voluntary certification program, American Humane
Certified, involves producers following a set of Association standards for “birth through
slaughter,”70 written by its scientific advisory committee,71 and receiving an initial thirdparty audit followed by annual audits once a producer has been certified. 72 The
organization offers certification for beef and dairy cattle, broiler chickens, various types of
laying hens (cage free versus free range, for example), pigs, and turkeys.73 Fifty producers
are currently certified.74 This somewhat low number of participating farms—dominated
primarily by egg and poultry producers—might result from what appears to be a relatively
stringent set of standards with close tracking of compliance. For example, with respect to
the welfare of beef cattle, each certified producer must report details such as the exact
number of various types of cattle at the farm (cows, bulls, calves, and others), the “monthly
number of pounds of beef sold,” information on animal housing, and the name of the entity
who transports cattle from the farm “for any reason.”75 The standards, which exceed 100
pages for many of the animals covered, range from requirements for maintaining and
following certain plans, such as plans ensuring adequate nutrition and lighting for cattle as
well as documenting herd health, to specific requirements such as feeding young calves
colostrum and prohibitions on yelling or screaming at cattle, among hundreds of other
specifics.76
Certified Humane offers a similar standard certification program with a goal to
“improve the lives of animals by driving consumer demand for kinder and more responsible
farm animal practices.”77 Their standards, which are also livestock-specific and relatively

JAMIE RENNER & ELLEN GRISWOLD, AM. SOC’Y FOR THE PROT. OF CRUELTY TO ANIMALS AND CTR. FOR
AGRIC. & FOOD SYS. AT VT. LAW SCH., FARM ANIMAL WELFARE CERTIFICATION GUIDE 7 (2017),
https://www.aspca.org/sites/default/files/frm-wlfr-cert-guide-feb2017.pdf.
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About Our Program, AM. HUMANE ASS’N, http://www.humaneheartland.org/about-us (last visited Nov.
4, 2017).
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AM. HUMANE FARM PROGRAM, AM. HUMANE CERTIFIED, ANIMAL WELFARE STANDARDS AUDIT TOOL:
BEEF CATTLE 1 (2017),
http://humaneheartland.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3&Itemid=106&jsmallfib=1
&dir=JSROOT/Animal+Welfare+Audit+Tools.
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RENNER & GRISWOLD, supra note 67, at 7.
71
AM. HUMANE FARM PROGRAM, supra note 70, at 1.
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Becoming American Humane Certified, supra note 69.
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Science-Based Standards, AM. HUMANE ASS’N,
http://www.humaneheartland.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=3&Itemid=106&jsmal
lfib=1&dir=JSROOT/Animal+Welfare+Full+Standards+%2B+Supplements (last visited Nov. 4, 2017).
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All Producers, AM. HUMANE ASS’N, http://www.humaneheartland.org/humane-certifiedproducers/category/all-producers (last visited Nov. 4, 2017).
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HUMANE FARM ANIMAL CARE, ANIMAL CARE STANDARDS: BEEF CATTLE 2 (2014),
http://certifiedhumane.org/wp-content/uploads/Std14.BeefCattle.2A-1.pdf.
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certification programs, in addition to AWA described infra. See Sullivan, supra note 1, at 411 (listing these
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lengthy, focus on “access to wholesome and nutritious feed,” “appropriate environmental
design,” “caring and responsible planning and management,” “skilled, knowledgeable and
conscientious animal care,” and “[c]onsiderate handling, transport, and slaughter.” 78 The
standards are written by a scientific committee consisting of “animal scientists,
veterinarians, and producers,”79 and program participants receive initial certification after
an inspection and thereafter receive annual inspections and certificate renewals upon
passing the inspection.80
Global Animal Partnership is another large third-party provider of standards,
auditing, and certification for animal welfare. Its welfare standards which include five
“steps” ranging from basic animal welfare to the most rigorous standards involving an
“animal-centered” farm.81 Suppliers that include this label on their products must have
passed an initial third-party audit to prove compliance with the standards and undergo an
on-farm audit every fifteen months.82
Beyond these major certification programs83 available to both small and large farms,
Animal Welfare Approved (AWA) is a commonly-used animal welfare audit and
certification program tailored specifically to smaller, independent family farms.84 AWA
writes standards “in collaboration with scientists, veterinarians, researchers, and farmers,”
certifies farmer compliance with these standards, and audits each participating farm “at
least once a year” to ensure ongoing compliance.85
In other cases, associations of livestock producers have guidelines that producers can
voluntarily follow without being part of a formal certification program. For example, the
National Turkey Federation publishes Animal Care Best Management Practices with standards
for various control points—identifiable, discrete aspects of raising turkeys for which separate
standards are specified, such as “building facilities and equipment design,” “personnel
training,” and “feed and water supply” and “environmental control and bird comfort.”86 Other
associations publish more general guidelines designed for educational purposes, not
certification. For example, the Beef Quality Association (BQA) has Cattle Care & Handling
Guidelines with recommendations for proper handling, feeding, and transport of cattle, as well
as disease prevention and similar practices that potentially improve meat quality but also affect
animal welfare. The BQA emphasizes that the guidelines are “to be used as an educational
four programs); RENNER & GRISWOLD, supra note 67, (comparing Certified Humane, Global Animal
Partnership, and AWA).
78
HUMANE FARM ANIMAL CARE, supra note 76, at i.
79
Id. at ii.
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HUMANE FARM ANIMAL CARE, PROGRAM/POLICY MANUAL 13 (2016), http://certifiedhumane.org/wpcontent/uploads/Pol16.1A.pdf.
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5-Step Animal Welfare Rating, WHOLE FOODS MKT., http://www.wholefoodsmarket.com/missionvalues/animal-welfare/5-step-animal-welfare-rating (last visited Nov. 4, 2017).
82
Consumers are Paying More Attention to Where Their Food is Being Sourced, GLOBAL ANIMAL
PARTNERSHIP, https://globalanimalpartnership.org/partners/retailers-foodservice/ (last visited Oct. 28,
2017).
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HUMANE FARM ANIMAL CARE, supra note 81, at 4.
84
About, ANIMAL WELFARE APPROVED, https://animalwelfareapproved.us/about/ (last visited Oct. 28,
2017).
85
Id.
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NAT’L TURKEY FED’N, ANIMAL CARE: BEST MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 15–23 (2012),
http://www.eatturkey.com/sites/default/files/welfarm2012.pdf.
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resource.”87 These types of industry standards often meet skepticism because they typically do
not “employ animal-welfare experts at any step of the process,” in addition to lacking
auditing.88 Professor Sullivan notes, however, that United Egg Producers employs independent
auditing for its Animal Husbandry Guidelines.89
Some grocery stores, restaurants, and other businesses also conduct supply chain
verification for animal welfare.90 For example, Whole Foods Market requires suppliers to
verify compliance with minimum standards, which include, for example, a prohibition on
animals being raised in cages or crates or being tethered and a requirement that ruminants
“spend at least two-thirds of their life on pasture.”91 Suppliers must use a third-party auditor
to demonstrate compliance with these standards.92 All beef, pork, chicken, and non-kosher
turkey sold at Whole Foods also must be certified by the nonprofit Global Animal
Partnership.93 McDonald’s indicates that in 2000 it “worked to make sure the hens our
suppliers worked with were properly cared for by increasing the space around them and
ensuring there wasn’t any forced molting. We also monitored that area to make sure all
waste was disposed of properly.”94 It additionally promises that by 2025 all of its eggs will
be “sourced from hens raised in a cage-free aviary system, which is a hen housing system
where the hens roam freely through an open barn or section within the barn.”95 The chain
has similarly committed to ensure that its suppliers have phased out gestation stalls for
pregnant sows “by the end of 2022.”96
The range of informal to formal labeling, certification and auditing, supply chain
verification, and other market-based approaches that rely on information conveyed to
consumers and changes in consumer and producer behavior based on this information
suffer from a variety of flaws. As shown in the nutrition labeling context, consumers often
do not read labels, and even when they do read them, they have difficulty adequately
understanding the information and putting it to good use.97 Further, in the animal welfare
context, the “profusion of competing animal-welfare labels,” many of which are not
particularly rigorous and are not backed by certification and auditing programs, might
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BEEF QUALITY ASSURANCE, CATTLE CARE & HANDLING GUIDELINES 4 (2015),
http://www.bqa.org/Media/BQA/Docs/cchg2015_final.pdf.
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Id. See also Nicole E. Negowetti, Opening the Barnyard Door: Transparency and the Resurgence of AgGag & Veggie Libel Laws, 38 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 1345, 1390–91 (2015) (describing the Whole Foods
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contribute to consumer doubt regarding the quality of these claims, as well as general
confusion as to their meaning.98 Some scholars and advocates have accordingly called for
one harmonized, verified standard—either government or nonprofit based.99
Outside of supermarkets and chain restaurants, many consumers appear to rely on a
different mechanism for purchasing food produced more humanely. As discussed in the
following Part, many consumers appear to seek out local food as a proxy for animal
welfare, in addition to other reasons for preferring local food.
IV. MARKET-BASED STRATEGIES FOR LOCALISM AND ANIMAL WELFARE
Relying on consumers to nudge producer behavior toward better treatment of animals
will be a particularly difficult project because as others have observed, the welfare of the
animals behind a food product is a “credence quality”—one that cannot be ascertained by
looking at or consuming the product.100 Choosing supposedly “local” products is a rough,
but somewhat easier means of ensuring minimal welfare standards. But the “local”
attribute, too, is largely a credence quality, with the exception of food purchased on-farm,
where the conditions behind the food can be directly observed, aside from certain stages
like the slaughtering process.101 And the local label is commonly abused. This Part
discusses localism as a proxy for animal welfare and the problem of local food fraud, then
briefly explores potential strategies for addressing the problem, with a focus on the
restaurant context.
A. Localism as a Proxy for Animal Welfare
The recent explosive growth of the local food movement results from a variety of
factors, including many with little connection to animal welfare. Shoppers at farmers’
markets and farm-to-table diners seek out higher-quality, better-tasting food and also cite
to the environmental attributes (whether real or perceived) and community benefits of
locally-sourced products.102 But many consumers also purchase food raised on small,
independent farms for reasons relating to animal welfare.103 Indeed, even when their
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preferences are not primarily welfare based, consumers “place a high precedence on any
information that can relate to the origin and production of their food”104—including meat—
according to surveys. And livestock raised on smaller farms with fewer animals are less
likely to be crammed into small living quarters and, in some cases, more likely to have
access to the outdoors than animals on large factory farms.105 If animals on local farms and
ranches are indeed better treated, though, what matters is that some consumers are willing
to seek out, and pay a premium for, local meat, leading ultimately to an expanded supply—
regardless of their motivations.
B. The Problem of Local Food Fraud
As with animal welfare labeling, there is currently no “standard definition” of local
foods, including local meat,106 yet “local” labeling—some deceptive and some not—
abounds. Unfortunately, fraudulent use of the label both at the producer and restaurant level
appears to be somewhat common. Investigations of farmers markets show that some sellers
claim to sell local food, but in fact purchase the food from grocery stores and resell it for a
premium.107 This is revealed primarily through visits to farms—for example, when vendors
claiming to sell local watermelon do not have any watermelon crops on their property—
or, in some cases, from sales of supposedly local produce that is not in season in the area.108
Some farmers markets have attempted to curb fraud and to verify the source of
produce by requiring farmers to submit crop acreages, crop lists, and other information that
allows market managers to assess whether the purportedly local food could have
realistically been grown by the producer.109 And some of these markets have staff that
periodically inspect farms to verify that the claimed acreages and crop types exists.110 But
not all markets have the resources to carry out these types of verification and enforcement;
many simply rely on grower affidavits stating that the growers have in fact produced the
food at the market and that information in their crop and acreage lists is correct.111
It appears the false claims of localism at restaurants may be similarly common. In
addition to patronizing farmers markets, consumers can also find local food at
restaurants.112 Sometimes, however, menu items described as local are, in fact, not. In some

production to reject, or at least disapprove of, eggs, meat, and dairy products from confined animal feeding
operations (CAFOs)”).
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cases the deception may be accidental; a chef might write “local” on the blackboard if one
shipment of local lettuce has arrived and might forget to erase this claim when forty other boxes
of run-of-the-mill lettuce arrive on the food service truck.113 In other cases restaurants simply
claim to be “farm-to-table” or to have locally-sourced ingredients to charge more and attract
customers demanding these sorts of foods, yet they make little or no effort to regularly purchase
local ingredients. A two-month investigation by a Tampa Bay Times reporter, who looked at
fifty-four restaurants that claimed to use local ingredients, revealed rampant fraud.114 The
reporter checked invoices, called producers and vendors, and visited farms in order to trace
back the source of these restaurants’ ingredients; she also ordered DNA sampling for allegedly
local fish. The reporter concluded that “more often than not,” restaurant claims regarding local
food are “fairy tales.”115 The same could be true of restaurant claims to use non-local but
“humanely-raised” meat.
Some states attempt to curb this fraud as part of their inspections for food safety. But
the resources available for conducting these inspections are scant. The Tampa Bay Times
investigation noted that “[f]or 40,000-some Florida restaurants, 191 inspectors from the
state’s Department of Business and Professional Regulation oversee them all for safety,
sanitation and—occasionally—lies.”116 The department indicates that “[m]isrepresentation
of food items at restaurants has been of particular interest in recent years,”117 and, from
2006 through November 2017, it investigated 1,773 cases with violations.118 The vast
majority of the violations appear to be seafood-based, with descriptions such as “menu
advertises grouper [a Florida fish]. No grouper on site, product on hand is panga [a
Vietnamese fish].”119 Various uses of imitation crab in lieu of advertised carb are also quite

(indicating that all local food purchased in a portion of Massachusetts and Vermont amounted to $8.9
million in sales, with $2 million of those purchases coming from restaurants buying the local food).
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common.120 Few non-seafood violations are noted,121 likely because it takes a reasonable
amount of effort and resources to track invoices associated with meat and eggs in freezers
and confirm the origin of those products. Locating imitation crab, in contrast, is a somewhat
easier endeavor.
C. Potential Solutions
For purchases direct from producers or with only one or two links between the producer
and supplier, such as in a grocery store, improved labeling of local products could better assure
consumers that the products they are purchasing are in fact local. This, of course, raises other
questions such as the need to develop a unified definition of local. But setting aside for now
these important considerations for perfecting labels, relatively simple approaches such as
including on the meat package the name and address of the entity that raised the meat could
allow the consumer to relatively quickly verify the source of the meat. Because most meat
products must go through a USDA-certified slaughterhouse (with the exception of poultry on
small farms),122 states could require the slaughterhouse to add a label to the packaging
indicating the farm from which the animal was delivered to the slaughterhouse.
This labeling approach—while capitalizing on a common processing point for most
local meats—would not be as simple as it sounds. Many small family farms already object
to the limited packaging options at slaughterhouses, such as the inability to obtain valueadded packaging like vacuum sealing.123 But if slaughterhouses that accept meat from
small independent farms could identify a relatively inexpensive type of label that would
adhere to the common types of packaging used, such as freezer paper, for a small added
fee this label could be placed on all meats leaving the slaughterhouse.
Verifying the local nature—as well as humanely-raised claims—of restaurant meats,
which account for a significant percentage of meat consumed, will be more difficult and
costly. It is unlikely that cash-strapped states would be willing to pay for more inspectors
to look beyond the imitation crab meat and verify that various meat and egg products in
freezers in fact came from local farms. But if slaughterhouses had to include a farm name
and address on all meat packaging, the limited number of inspectors already employed by
states could look relatively quickly through refrigerators and freezers to verify the origin
of most of the animal products. And penalties, which are currently low,124 could be
120
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increased, perhaps dramatically, to offset the low probability of getting caught. For
restaurants making humanely-raised claims, some combination of increased inspections
and increased penalties may be the best solution—if and where the political will to
implement them exists.
For local food claims, local food groups and nonprofit agricultural organizations
could supply the resources needed for verifying the local origin of animal products at
restaurants, conducting the types of investigations completed by the Tampa Bay Times.
These groups could have volunteers ask restaurants for the origins of their animal products
and then call the farmers to verify that they in fact supply the restaurants. These groups
could then engage in informal internet-based shaming strategies for restaurants that
appeared to be repeat offenders with respect to local food claims. Local farmers affected
by the dilution of the value of their product through fake substitution could also threaten
legal action in the form of misappropriation.
Verifying that meats and eggs on restaurant menus are in fact local or humanelyraised will not be easy, particularly in the absence of increased governmental enforcement.
Without improved verification, however, consumer spending on animal welfare will be
misdirected, and more animals, along with producers of genuinely local and humanelyraised meats, will suffer.
V. CONCLUSION
With concern surrounding the humane treatment of livestock seemingly becoming
stronger, the most direct path to improved farm animal welfare would be a regulatory one.
Federal, state, or local officials—or all of them—would issue statutes, regulations, or
ordinances mandating a baseline of humane animal treatment and providing for monitoring
and enforcement of these requirements. But aside from very limited federal regulation and
a small set of state and local regulations, this has not been the path taken so far. A secondbest solution would involve reliance on market-based mechanisms that provide consumers
with accurate, understandable, easily processed and verified information about the
conditions to which farm animals were subjected while being raised and slaughtered. But
these, too, are limited, and verification of animal welfare practices can be time consuming
and expensive, as well as difficult for consumers to process and fully understand.
Relying on local production as a proxy for animal welfare is perhaps a third-best
mechanism, but it is a useful one. Small, independent farms are more likely to provide a
level of animal welfare superior to factory farms, and some customers can directly verify
certain animal practices by visiting the farm and purchasing their food there. But for the
customers who rely on the “local” or “humanely-raised” label when buying meat at a
restaurant, better practices are needed to verify that the meat has the attributes ascribed to
it. In their absence, producers of local and humanely-raised meats, consumers, and animals
will suffer.
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